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I can tell you from the frontlines of the foreclosure crisis, that the Obama administration's Home Affordable Modification Plan or HAMP is a large scale failure.  Consider these facts from the ACORN and the Center for Responsible Lending: 

-A family loses their home to foreclosure every 13 seconds.

-15 million homeowners owe more than their mortgages are worth.

-9 million foreclosures by the end of 2012 resulting in a $2 trillion loss in home property values in the United States.  With millions of option ARMs and Alt-A loans scheduled to reset in the next few years, coupled with rising unemployment, the projected numbers are likely to only get worse. 

"Mortgage servicing companies are key to addressing the foreclosure crisis because they occupy the unique niche of collecting payments and making decisions about foreclosures on behalf of investors who own pools of mortgage backed securites.  Unfortunately, most workouts offered by servicers are not aff ordable to the homeowner, and many even fail to lower the monthly payment that led to the delinquency, thereby resulting in high re-default rates." 

If you are reading this Blog, then chances are you have already failed in your attempts to get a loan modification.  Consider the reasons why the HAMP program is not working:

Mortgage servicers remain severely understaffed and are not complying with the HAMP contracts they signed.

HAMP requires servicers to suspend all foreclosure activity until it canbe determined if a homeowner is eligible for a modification; instead, servicers are proceedingwith foreclosures before such determinations are made.  In direct violation of the guidelines, some servicers also continue to

1) require homeowners to make large, up-front cash payments as a condition for being considered for a modification;

2) fail to apply the HAMP rules to all portfolios being serviced;

3) refuse to evaluate for HAMP modification those distressed homeowners currently paying on time;

4) base the affordability calculations on interest-only or option-arm minimum payments, when HAMP requires affordability to be based on the loan's principal interest, taxes and insurance; and

5) neglect to offer principal forbearance when interest rate reductions are not enough to make the loan affordable.

Source: 

http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Fair_Housing/Reports/HAMP_WhitePaper3.pdf

Does this sound familiar?  The HAMP contract is an agreement between the Treasury Department and the individual loan servicers.  Currently, a borrower has no clear private cause of action or right to sue a servicer if they fail to play by the rules.  Only the Treasury is in a contractual position to pressure the servicers into compliance and so far, that pressure has been quite mild.  Its a classic case of the Fox watching the Chickens. 

The HAMP program will never succeed unless the Obama administration creates a strong disincentive for the servicers that ignore the HAMP guidelines.  The obvious solution is to create a private cause of action and enable borrowers who have been denied due process under the HAMP, to sue, to have their day in court, to seek justice.  Let the law dawgs out, Mr. President! 

 

 

 

 

 

Source:  http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Fair_Housing/Reports/HAMP_WhitePaper3.pdf

 

 

 

Through December 2009, out of the 1,164,507 trial mods offered to date, only 6% or 66,465 homeowners received permanent loan mods under the HAMP plan.  However, the government claims that an additional 46,000 permanent offers are awaiting borrower acceptance as a result of the the Treasury departments increased pressure on servicers.

Source:  http://financialstability.gov/docs/report.pdf

Approximately 89% of eligible mortgage debt outstanding is covered by HAMP participating servicers.  During the 4th quarter of 2009, the number of servicers who have signed servicer participation agreements to modify loans under HAMP rose from 63 to 102.

WARNING:  Keep in mind that not every investor or loan pool within a servicer's portfolio necessarily signs up for the HAMP plan.  Investors can opt out on an individual basis.

National HAMP results:

Number of Trial Period Plan Offers Extended to Borrowers (Cumulative):  1,164,507
All HAMP Trials Started Since Program Inception:  902,620
All Active Modifications (Trial and Permanent):  853,696
Active Trial Modifications:  787,231
PermanentModifications:  66,465
Permanent Modifications Pending Borrower Acceptance:  46,056
Total Permanent Modifications Approved by Servicers:  112,521

California HAMP results:

Active trial mods:  158,935 [20% of national total]

Permanent loan mods:  13,353 [20% of national total]

Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana HAMP results:

Active trial mods:  45,945  [29% of state total]

Permanent loan mods:  3,469 [26% of state total]

Riverside-San Bernadino-Ontario HAMP results:

Active trial mods:  36,671  [23% of state total]

Permanent loan mods:  3,383 [25% of state total]

 

 

 

 

 

 

From the front lines:  This is a timely and informative article on the likelihood of principal reduction for borowers in distress.  Wells Fargo and its subsidiary Wachovia remain the most willing, having cut $2billion of principal in 2009.  While permanent loan modifications results are weak, principal reduction remains extremely rare.  Principal deferment may help but doesn't solve the long term problem.  2009 total principal adjustments were only 21,000 out of nearly 7 million families that are behind on their mortgages.   The conflict between first and second mortgage holders willingness to share the losses remains a stumbling block.  Further incentivizing lenders with tax payer subsidies is not the answer.  It will be a long slow slog to the bottom of the housing market unless Congress provides homeowners the leverage they could gain over lenders by reforming the bankruptcy cram down rules.
 
 
 
Principal Cuts on Lender Menus as Foreclosures Rise (Update1)
 

By John Gittelsohn and Prashant Gopal

Jan. 7 (Bloomberg) -- Efforts by U.S. banks to help distressed homeowners have focused mainly on temporary fixes such as interest-rate reductions that may only put off the day of reckoning, despite policy makers wanting them to do more.

Banks may be forced to resort to a remedy they've been trying to avoid -- principal reductions -- as another wave of foreclosures looms and payments on risky loans rise, Bloomberg BusinessWeek magazine reports in the Jan. 18 issue.

While interest-rate reductions or extending loan terms reduce homeowners' monthly payments, they don't give much comfort to borrowers who owe more on their homes than their properties are worth. Borrowers who don't have equity in their homes are more likely to hand over the keys when they run into trouble. "The evidence is irrefutable," Laurie Goodman, senior managing director of Amherst Securities Group in New York, testified before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee on Dec. 8. "Negative equity is the most important predictor of default."

The 25 percent plunge in residential real estate prices from their 2006 peak has left homeowners underwater by $745 billion, according to research firm First American CoreLogic -- a number that tops the government's $700 billion bailout for banks. That's why Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair is considering incentives for lenders to cut the principal on as much as $45 billion of mortgages acquired from seized banks. "We're looking now at whether we should provide some further loss-sharing for principal writedowns," says Bair. "Now you're in a situation where even the good mortgages are going bad because people are losing their jobs."

Deepening Crisis

The foreclosure crisis is likely to deepen this year in part because payments on many adjustable-rate mortgages are set to balloon. Unless there's a sharp recovery in property values or a change in lenders' willingness to cut principal, at least 7 million borrowers currently behind on their payments will lose their homes, Goodman estimates.

Some lenders may be coming around to the idea of principal reduction. "If you can right-size the mortgage and return to an equity situation, the incentive is to stay," says Micah Green, an attorney at Patton Boggs in Washington and a lobbyist for a coalition of mortgage bond investors. Banks can either forgive principal outright or defer it. In deferrals the borrower must pay back the full amount on the original mortgage when he sells the property; if the ultimate sales price doesn't cover the principal, the homeowner has to pay the difference, making it a less effective tool.

Deferring Principal

A principal deferral helped Marcus Beckett stave off foreclosure. The 42-year-old small-business owner couldn't afford his $2,413 monthly mortgage bill after his income dropped and his son, Riley, was born. In October, OneWest Bank agreed to defer $66,000 of the $423,000 debt on his two-bedroom condominium, which he'll have to pay back if he sells his Aliso Viejo, California, home. The monthly tab on the house he bought in 2006 is now $1,314. "It's like I got a second chance on life," Beckett says. "I feel, mentally, I'm able to keep making payments."

While principal reductions remain rare, banks are doing them more often. In the third quarter of 2009, some 21,000 home loans -- 3 percent of the total modified mortgages -- included a principal reduction or deferral, according to Mortgage Metrics, a government publication. That's up from 6,245 in the first quarter of 2009, the first time the U.S. reported the data.

Positive Results

Banks that negotiate principal reductions have seen positive results. Last year, Wells Fargo & Co. cut $2 billion of principal on delinquent loans. After the modifications, the six- month re-default rate on those loans was roughly 15 percent to 20 percent. That's less than half the industry average. "We are very comfortable with what we've been doing," says Franklin Codel, chief financial officer of the bank's home-lending unit. "We offer a principal reduction if that makes sense for that individual borrower's situation."

When principal reductions were granted for pay-option adjustable-rate mortgages -- loans with high default rates because they enabled borrowers to pay less than the cost of interest as the principal increased -- the re-default rate after 60 days fell to 6 percent, according to Mortgage Metrics.

"In terms of incentive, you have more skin in the game or less negative equity to deal with," said Fred Phillips-Patrick, director of credit policy for the Office of Thrift Supervision.

Demand Better Deals

Many banks don't want word to get around that they reduce principal. They fear that homeowners who can afford their payments will demand better deals. John Lashley, a 44-year-old salesman in Huntersville, North Carolina, is making his payments. But he is thinking about walking away from his four- bedroom home unless his lender, Sun Trust Mortgage, agrees to cut the principal on his $345,000 loan.

The house next door recently sold for $260,000, and Lashley doesn't see the point of pouring money into his house when he may never recoup the investment he made in 2007. "Why should I stay in my house?" he says. "It's not a moral decision. It's a financial decision."

The conflicting interests of mortgage lenders and home- equity lenders is a roadblock to doing principal reductions. Banks, credit unions and thrifts held $951.6 billion in home- equity loans as of Sept. 30, according to Federal Reserve data.

Dueling Interests

Mortgage lenders don't want to cut principal unless the home-equity lenders agree to take a hit. Typically, though, the home-equity lenders are reluctant; much of the value of their loans would be wiped out. That could drive more banks into insolvency, says Joshua Rosner, an analyst at investment research firm Graham Fisher in New York.

The threat of lawsuits is also hampering principal reductions. In December 2008 money manager Greenwich Financial Services sued lender Countrywide Financial in New York State Supreme Court. Greenwich, which owns mortgage-backed securities, demanded 100 cents on the dollar for some Countrywide investments. The securities included loans on which Countrywide had agreed to cut $8.4 billion in principal and interest to settle allegations of predatory lending.

Greenwich Financial's case is pending. Bank of America Corp., which bought Countrywide in 2008, says: "We are confident any attempt to stop this program will be legally unsupportable." Greenwich says it's willing to accept loan changes that benefit borrowers.

No Pressure

So far the feds haven't put pressure on banks to forgive debt. President Barack Obama's $75 billion program to spur banks to alter loan terms doesn't require them to do so. But the FDIC and other regulators are looking at measures to promote the writedowns. Mark Zandi, the chief economist for Moody's Economy.com, who has testified before Congress on housing issues, proposes that banks receive a federal match of $1 for every $2 in principal reductions they offer to homeowners who were victims of predatory lending practices. "You're not going to wipe out all the borrowers' negative equity," he says. "This just gives them enough hope to get them committed again."

To contact the reporters on this story: Prashant Gopal in New York at pgopal2@bloomberg.net; John Gittelsohn in New York at johngitt@bloomberg.net.

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